A point of great confusion about sociocracy comes from the use of "consent" rather than "consensus" as the basis of decision-making. Organizations that now use consensus, and want to preserve it, are afraid of losing it if the adopt a sociocratic governance system. Organizations that want to avoid consensus decison-making, are afraid of sliding into it if they adopt "consent" decision-making.
I believe the differences between consensus and consent are largely cultural and in practice the two approaches are different only to the extent that a group practices good or bad decision-making processes. In other words, the criticisms of consensus decision-making that are made by sociocratic theorists are really criticisms of bad consensus decision-making. These criticisms lose some of their validity when examined from the point of view of experts in consensus.
The distinction is useful in introducing sociocracy to those who fear what they see as the vast sea of endless discussion in consensus decision-making. They are reassured that "consent" promises a method of decision making that is superior to autocratic managerial decision-making but short of an endless searching for "agreement" that characterizes badly used consensus decision-making.
The aim of sociocracy is inclusive decision-making because it has proven to be more effective. When people are included in decision-making, they are more committed to the decisions, and equally important, perhaps even more important, the decisions include their information about the course of action that is being decided. Decisions are thus based on all available knowledge and seek to establish harmonious and productive organizations through good decision-making.
There are two valuable distinctions between consent and consensus as practiced:
(1) The cognitive difference between asking for "agreement" and asking for "objections" is profound. Consensus facilitators are more likely to be searching for agreement or to start the discussion by emphasizing agreement. The mindset is to bring people together by emphasizing shared values the value of being in accord with each other.
Sociocratic facilitators specifically look for objections because asking for agreement affects the perception of participants, often adversely. It influences the kinds of solutions they will propose or accept because they fear being viewed as anti-community or uncollegial. Sociocratic groups understand that to hone a good decision, it must be examined critically and questioned. The objections must be examined as carefully in order to make a decision that can resolve all the issues that prompted the need for a decision in the first place.
(2) Consensus is specifically a decision-making process, not a governance or organizing structure. It is heavily dependent on the skills of the facilitator and the experience of the group. Groups using consensus have no predictable structure for the execution of decisions and must design their own. Since the only structures they are likely to be familiar with are designed to support majority vote decision-making and based on parliamentary procedure, the structure is usually poorly designed to support inclusive decison-making.
The sociocratic governance structure is specifically designed to support inclusive decision-making. Both the organizational structure and the basis of decison-making are based on principles derived from cybernetics, systems thinking, and chaos theory. Thus sociocratic decision-making and sociocratic governance are designed to support and reinforce each other.
When we look at the history of consensus decision-making, the distinctions between consensus and consent can be seen as ones of development and expansion, not difference.
A History of Consensus
Active application of consensus decision-making emerged in peace groups in the early 20th century at the same time that Kees Boeke, an ardent peace worker and Quaker, was teaching in a divided Europe and a Middle East that was in turmoil. During WW II, Boeke developed the first practical application of consensus decision-making in his residential school of approximately 400 teachers and students, calling it sociocracy. He outlined the principles of his system in an essay subtitled "Democracy as It Might Be."
In describing how his school functioned Kees Boeke referred to the "organization of the community by the community itself." He refers to his "system" as having three rules:
"First, the interests of all members must be considered, the individual bowing to the interests of the whole.
Second, no action can be taken if there are no solutions found that everyone can accept.
Third, all members must be ready to act according to these unanimous decisions."
Thus for Boeke consensus and sociocracy were synonymous. And "consensus" meant "unanimous." Is that how we use consensus today?
The earliest use of consent from the OED:
c.1225, from O.Fr. consentir, from L. consentire "feel together," from com- "with" + sentire "to feel." "Feeling together," hence, "agreeing, giving permission," a sense evolution that apparently took place in Fr. before the word reached Eng. Consensual is 1754; consensus is 1843.
English usage of "unanimous" dates from 1624. It comes from the Latin "unanim-is, -us", "unas" meaning "one" and "animus" meaning "mind." The OED gives two definitions:
1. In speaking of persons, "Of one mind or opinion; agreed," and
2. In speaking of beliefs, statements, actions, etc., "Exhibiting general agreement or consent."
As a noun "consent" means "Voluntary agreement to or acquiescence in what another proposes or desires; compliance, concurrence, permission." As a verb, to consent means "to agree together" or "to agree to a proposal, request, etc."
"Consensus" is defined as "agreement, accord, sympathy, common feeling." It was first used in English in 1854 in physiology to mean "general agreement or concord of different parts or organs of the body in effecting a given purpose; sympathy." An 1870 source makes this meaning clearer, "A mutually-dependent set of organs having a consensus of functions." Thus the organs are not all identical nor do they do identical things, they are just working in support of the same physiological functions.
By 1858 consensus was used generally to mean "a consensus of opinion, authority, testimony, etc." From a 1861 quotation, "Agreement in opinion; the collective unanimous opinion of a number of persons."
Thus the definition of "unanimous," "consent," and "consensus" is "general agreement." No more and no less.
Beyond General Agreement
We have, however, attached feelings to the word "consensus" that go beyond its definition. It means much more to those who cherish it than "general agreement." Boeke and many others include in the definition of consensus "the individual bowing to the interests of the whole." Others use the phrase, "in the best interests of the group" or "to the common good." The blending of these meanings, I suggest, comes from the Quaker practice of the Sense of the Meeting.
Barry Morely wrote Beyond Consensus: The Sense of the Meeting in the 1990s when he became concerned that "sense of the meeting" was disappearing into "consensus." Morely contends that "sense of the meeting" is different from consensus but the meanings= he ascribes to "consensus" are not the ones that people using consensus might accept. His definitions:
"Sense of the meeting is a gift. It came to the Quakers through their commitment to continuing revelation. They discovered that the Light which had come to teach the people could lead them to revealed corporate decisions. The Quakers cherished the gift. They handed it down as a spiritual heirloom from generation to generation, even as the Jews hand down their covenant with God."
"Consensus is the product of willfulness. We will ourselves to a decision. Sense of the Meeting is a product of willingness in which we allow ourselves to be led. It is the difference between reason and faith."
"Consensus is an outward process in which a vote is taken without saying either yea or nay. It involves listening to all concerns, and then, through a negotiation process, finding the best solution. Sense of the meeting hears all of the concerns, then moves beyond the verbal expressions to hear the spirit of the concern in order to discern what is 'right' for the group."
The cultural distinction I mentioned earlier is evdident here. In opposition to Morely's definition, consensus is often spoken of with reverence, as a desired state of peace, as if it were also a product of "listening to the Light." They expect the feel the kind of harmony that one would feel when experiencing the light.
This is where we find the limits of traditionally defined consensus decision-making, separated from faith and practice. A Quaker meeting consists of people who typically have been listening and studying together for many years. They not only share common beliefs, they tend to be socio-economically similar. Quaker meetings are relatively small and self-selecting. The foundations on which they base their decisions is very similar from one person the next compared, for example, to a random group of workers in a large corporation or the members of an urban community with an ethnically and socio-economically diverse population.
This commonality was also true of Boeke's school. He was working with teachers and children in an almost closed environment that had a clear aim -- the education of the students. He was also living in a small country, well unified in a battle against a common enemy, the Germans, and working with few resources and fewer choices. This alone would account for a strong sense of unity and purpose.
Practical Consensus
To make consensus workable in highly diverse groups, particularly between people who did not have daily contact nor shared aims in the rest of their lives, various teachers of consensus and professional facilitators have come to put limits on consensus, for example, redefining "agreement" to mean "agree that this is in the best interests of the group even though it may not be my personal preference." People are allowed to "stand aside" so the group can still declare consensus.
Some groups define consensus as "all but one" or "all but two." Culturally, consensus has come to mean many things from an almost sacred union of minds to a negotiated supra-majority vote.
In the 1960s, Gerard Endenburg, a student and friend of Boeke's, began to apply sociocracy in Endenburg Electric, a small manufacturing company in the Netherlands. In the business environment, Boeke's "individual bowing to the interests of the whole" and "unanimous" agreements were not workable. There was not enough time for everyone to meet together to work out traditional consensus agreements.
But Endenburg also knew that highly efficient systems in the mechanical and natural world are efficient precisely because they maintain their collaborative systems -- their "consensus." How?
As an engineer, he had learned that in nature and in machines, if a part cannot function, it stops. It objects. Thinking by analogy, he realized that in human systems, the analogous mechanism was "consent." A person could consent to a decision that affected their ability to function. Or object.
Further, these objections were vital to the functioning of the whole system. If one part of a system doesn't express its objections as soon as it experiences discomfort, the whole system could suddenly collapse and be irreparable. Consider the example of the body's organs working in "consensus." If one does not object as soon as it begins to fail, like the heart, the whole body will die.
Thus objections had to be taken seriously. Objections, Endenburg realized, not agreements, were the needed and necessary corrections that allowed a group to make good decisions and maintain energetic and harmonious functioning.
By changing the premise of "consent," "consensus," and "unanimous" from "agreement" to "no objections," Endenburg made inclusive decision-making more effective. Like parts in other systems, individuals give consent. The boiler doesn't consult with the thermostat about whether they are in "agreement" or not. The boiler works or doesn't work. By using the word "consent" he emphasized the process of resolving individual objections and avoided the religious and emotional connotations.
Endenburg put two further conditions on objections. Firstly, the objections had to be paramount, meaning they had to be serious enough to prevent the person from supporting the aims of the group. And secondly, they had to be reasoned. The person had to express their objections sufficiently clearly that the rest of the group could understand and resolve them.
In sociocracy if a decision would interfere with a person's ability to be enthusiastic and energetic in working toward the aims of the group, that person has an obligation to object. Objections are made in the context of the aim statement. Can I help the group acheive this aim if this decision is made? Will this decision interfere with my work? Will it help me do my work? Will it allow me to thrive as a member of this group?
Thus it is more accurate, I argue, to say that sociocracy is a further development of consensus decision-making that preserves fully inclusive decision-making and develops it so it is broadly applicable. Any group that has a clear and common aim whether it be a social, religious, business, or civic group, a family or a multi-national corporation, can use consent decision-making.
Further, within the sociocratic structure a group can decide, by consent, to use any other basis for decision making for some decisions.
Sharon
Villines, January
2007
Revised December 2007